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Some of the most fundamental decisions we make in our lives – like becoming
a parent or moving to a different part of the world – are transformative. Ac-
cording to Laurie Paul (2014), transformative decisions pose a major problem
to us because they fall outside the realm of rationality. Her argument in fa-
vor of that conclusion rests on the premise that the subjective value, i.e. the
value of experiencing a certain outcome of a decision, plays the central role
in transformative decisions. This paper challenges that premise and hence
the overall conclusion that transformative decisions are usually not rational.
In the theoretical part, we specify the conditions under which transformative
decisions are possibly rational and likely to be rational. The data we present
in the empirical part reveals that the subjective value often plays only a mi-
nor role in people’s decision process. Putting both parts together, we argue
that people have a great chance in making rational transformative choices.
Keywords: Transformative Experience; Subjective Value; Rational Choice;
Multi-criteria Decision Making; Experimental Studies.
1 Introduction
Imagine that you are on holidays and you are confronted with a choice bet-
ween two Indian dishes that are made of spices you have never tasted before.
Suppose you consider to have a child or remain childless. Or, slightly less
mundane, think about aliens that have taken over the world, and you have
to make a choice between either being transported to an unknown planet
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where you can start a new life, or staying on earth but living under unknown
alien rule.
In her book Transformative Experience, Paul argues that we usually can-
not make a rational choice in such decision making situations (Paul 2014).
The first part of her argument rests on two premises. Premise (i) concerns the
nature of the experiences that characterize those decision – hereafter transfor-
mative decisions. Transformative decisions involve either epistemically (spi-
ces case), or both epistemically and personally transformative experiences
(child case, alien rule case), where having an epistemically transformative
experience of x is the only way to know what it is like to x, e.g., having
the experience of being a father or eating dragon fruit is the only way to
know what it is like to be a father or to eat dragon fruit. A transformati-
ve experience which is also personally transformative, additionally changes
one’s fundamental preferences, e.g., experiencing life on an alien planet will
certainly change one’s core preferences.1 Importantly, when a decision is epis-
temically transformative, the agent faces an epistemic wall which she cannot
penetrate through either imagination, testimony or scientific investigations.2
Premise (ii) of the argument states that the subjective value – the value
of experiencing a certain outcome of a decision – plays the central role in
transformative decisions. Applying this point to the decision on whether or
not to have a child, Paul claims: "(...) the value of what it is like for the agent
plays the central role, if not the only role, in the decision to procreate."(Paul
2015a, p. 153). While this aspect of the subjective value is often neglected
in discussions on transformative choices, it is a crucial ingredient to Paul’s
argument and is emphasized by Paul frequently.3 Consider an example of Paul
1 Purely personally transformative experiences are not discussed at any length by Paul.
2 Paul states: "(...) and remember, current science doesn’t pronounce on how you’ll re-
spond, and experiences vary widely, so you can’t rely on testimony."(Paul 2014, p. 36).
Paul’s main point is that scientific data on large groups do not give fine-grained in-
formation on how you respond to a particular experience (Paul 2014, p. 131, 132). See
Cappelen & Dever (2016), for a critical discussion how empathy is related to the ideology
of the first person.
3 E.g. she writes: "(...) and an essential part of your deliberation concerns what your future
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where the subjective value fails to play the central role: Many adults decide
to have a child because they "need an heir, or more hands to work the farm,
or whatever."(Paul 2014, p. 85) While this is perhaps not the most common
approach for most adults in our times, the general point should be clear.
Paul’s challenge to the rationality of a transformative decision does not even
begin to arise, if people make decisions independently of the transformative
experiences connected with those decisions. Thus, the challenge only applies
if the subjective value plays the central role. What this means exactly, will
be clarified in section 2.
Given the first two premises of the argument, we can now substantiate
Paul’s claim that transformative choices cannot be rational, by considering
the argument in full:4
i. One cannot know the subjective value of at least one outcome of a
transformative decision dt.5
ii. The subjective value plays the central role in transformative decisions
dt.
iii. If (i) & (ii), then the ranking of options in a transformative decision
dt cannot be determined.
iv. If the ranking of options in a decision cannot be determined, then such
a decision cannot be rational.
∴ Transformative decisions dt cannot be rational.
life will be like (...)"(Paul 2014, p. 3). For further discussions of this point, see also pages
4, 25, 26, 74, 75, 85, 126 of her book.
4 See Friedman (unpublished manuscript), for an alternative formulation of the decision
problem which focuses on the role of authenticity within transformative choices. See
also Campbell (2015). However, it seems possible to formulate the challenge for rational
choice without referring to the concept of authenticity.
5 A transformative decision dt is a decision which is not merely based on a non-experiential
criterion. We use this specification to exclude those cases from the discussion in which
the subjective value is fully disregarded in the decision making process.
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One of Paul’s most significant insights in her book is revealed by premise
(iii) of the argument. If both premise (i) and premise (ii) are true, then it
is impossible to determine an ordinal ranking of the possible options in such
a decision.6 If the subjective value of having a child cannot be identified,
and if this value plays a central role in the decision process, then there is
no way to assign a specific or even probable overall value to the decision
option having a child. It follows that if no overall value can be assigned
to that option, then ranking the options having a child and not having a
child is rendered impossible. The final premise (iv) now states a basic tenet
of standard rational decision theory. A decision can be rational only if the
options in a decision process can be ranked.7 The conclusion is as important
as it is devastating. According to her argument, some of the most fundamental
decisions in our life remain outside the realm of rationality. However, all hope
is not lost. Paul suggests that instead of basing one’s choice on the subjective
value, we should instead make transformative decisions by asking ourselves
how much we value new experiences or new selves (Paul 2014, p. 123).8
In this paper we challenge the soundness of Paul’s argument by focussing
primarily on premises (ii) and (iii), and present empirical results that suggest
that premise (ii) is false for many transformative decisions. In contrast, we
accept Paul’s arguments in favor of premises (i) and (iv). In favor of premise
(i), Paul draws an analogy with Jackson’s famous Mary thought experiment:
Not having seen colors so far in her life, Mary cannot know how it will feel
6 Whereas Paul does not herself speak of ordinal ranking, we believe premise (iii) preser-
ves the core idea of her claim. A similar reconstruction of that premise can be found in
Dougherty et al. (2015, p. 305): "(...) If an agent cannot rationally judge the subjecti-
ve value of a phenomenal outcome for her, then she cannot rationally choose between
options when one of these options would lead to this phenomenal outcome."
7 For a discussion of ordinal preference orderings, see, e.g. Savage (1954), Chapter 2. Also
note, that a decision that cannot be rational is not thereby irrational, but rather falls
outside the realm of rationality.
8 See Shupe (2016) for a critical discussion of Paul’s positive thesis. According to our
empirical results, only in the vampire case do people primarily base their decisions on
the revelatory value. Of course, the results do not tell us whether people should rely on
the revelatory value (see section 3 and 4).
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like to perceive colors until she leaves her room. Analogously, not having
become a parent in one’s life so far, we cannot know what it will feel like
to become a parent. As noted above, premise (iv) is part of the standard
normative decision theory, according to which agents should make a choice
by determining the values of each possible outcome, and choose the outcome
with the highest expected value. However, others have applied different con-
cepts of rationality. First, according to Pettigrew, Paul does not challenge the
preference-first conception (Pettigrew 2015, p. 668) which merely requires an
agent to adhere to the basic axioms of decision theory, e.g. completeness, no
transitivity violations.9 Second, many theorists endorse a satisfying theory of
rationality. Simply put, the idea behind this concept is that it is rational to
choose an option in case it is sufficiently satisfactory.10 Of course, one might
argue that in a transformative choice an agent cannot fulfill the satisfying
theory of rationality either, since she cannot know whether any of the options
is good enough.
Having reconstructed Paul’s argument and motivated its premises, here
is how we will proceed in the rest of the paper: In Section 2, we analyze how
the centrality of a decision criterion and the possibility to rank options in
transformative decisions hang together. More specifically, we discuss what it
means for the subjective value to be central such that the person will ma-
ke a choice that is necessarily not rational. However, even if the subjective
value of, e.g., becoming a parent, is not the central criterion, many transfor-
mative decisions will nonetheless fail to be rational. We therefore developed
a statistical model that can tell us more precisely, how likely it is that a
9 Does Pettigrew’s challenge hold? One might at least doubt whether transformative de-
cisions are complete: An agent might neither prefer to become a vampire nor to stay
human nor to be indifferent between the alternatives. In this respect, there might exist a
very interesting overlap with so-called hard cases of comparison (see, e.g., Chang (2015),
Messerli & Reuter (2017).
10The concept goes back to Simon (1953). See also Weber (2000). In Simon’s view, a notion
of rationality according to which an agent needs to maximize utility is too demanding.
That notion presupposes computational capacities that we do not possess.
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decision is rational given the importance of the subjective value. Crucially,
the likelihood increases with a decrease in the importance of the subjective
value. Thus, to properly determine how likely it is that a person will make
a rational transformative decision, we need to find out how people judge the
importance of various decision criteria in transformative decisions. And that
is exactly the task we have taken up in Section 3. In a series of studies, we
not only found that premise (ii) of the argument seems mistaken, the data
also suggests, that what it is like to experience a certain outcome is only one
among many other decision criteria that play a role in transformative deci-
sions. Section 4 concludes with a general discussion, whereby we deal with
possible objections against our methodology and our results.
Before we proceed, we would like to address in advance one worry that
readers familiar with Paul’s writings might have. The experiments we have
conducted reveal which decision criteria various people in fact take into ac-
count when facing a transformative decision. However, Paul’s project is at
least in part normative, i.e., she is concerned with normative decision theory,
not with descriptive decision theory. Are we therefore not mistaken in chal-
lenging Paul’s claim empirically? We are not, because the normative aspects
of Paul’s argument concern the relation between the values of the relevant
outcomes and the rationality of the decision (premise (iv)) but not which
criteria are considered important for determining the value of the outcomes.
Thus, we fully agree with Paul when she states that "the normative standard
for rational decision-making is that the agent or decision-maker should choose
the act that has the highest expected value. (2014, p. 21, our italics). Indeed,
in Section 2 we fundamentally rely on this normative standard to develop a
model for determining the relation between the centrality of a decision cri-
terion and whether or not the decision is rational. However, Paul makes a
descriptive claim about the criteria that determine which outcome has the
highest value. According to Paul, "while the subjective values are not the on-
ly values of these outcomes, they are some of the most central and important
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ones, and an emphasis on them fits the dominant cultural paradigm."(2014,
p. 26). Thus, Paul’s claim and the putatively dominant cultural paradigm
are not about how we should determine the value of certain outcomes, they
are rather claiming that subjective values are most central and important.
There can therefore be little doubt that Paul bases her normative claims on
a purely descriptive analysis of the importance of subjective values.
2 Transformative Decisions and
Rational Choice
In Section 1, we started our discussion of Paul’s both surprising and insightful
conclusion that transformative decisions dt are not rational by reconstructing
the underlying argument in favor of that conclusion. We also highlighted that
a crucial premise in her argument is the claim that the subjective value(s) of
the possible outcome(s) in a transformative choice is central to the decision.
This claim immediately raises two questions: first, what does it mean to be
central? Second, is it really the case that the subjective value plays the central
role in transformative decisions. Paul does not address in very much detail
the first question but primarily relies on our intuitive grasp of what it means
to be central. In contrast, in regards to the second question, Paul contends
that in a transformative choice like whether or not to become a parent, most
people, at least in Western cultures, take the subjective value to be of utmost
importance. In Section 3, we present results that strongly suggest that Paul
is mistaken in her assessment of what most people take to be important in
transformative decisions.
In this part of the paper, we will specify how we need to interpret ”cen-
trality” such that Paul’s argument is valid (Section 2.1), and then provide a
model that tells us how likely it is that a person makes a rational transfor-
mative choice given the importance that she places on the subjective value
(Section 2.2).
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2.1 When a transformative decision is
possibly rational
To motivate our investigation into the topic, consider a hiring committee at
a university that needs to decide which candidate to hire for an open aca-
demic position. Let us look at two extremes: On the one hand, it might be
the case that the candidate’s publication record is the only criterion that
is taken into account. Subsequently, other factors like teaching skills, age,
interests, etc. are of no concern. On the other hand, the committee might
fully disregard the quantity and quality of the publication records, and, e.g.,
decides to select the person who lives closest to the university. Obviously,
in the former case, a candidate’s publication record is all that counts, and
a fortiori central to the decision-making process. In the latter case, the pu-
blication record plays no role whatsoever. The reality of most decisions of
hiring committees is hopefully in between these two extremes: Publication
records are important but other criteria play a role too. Analogously, on the
one hand, the what-it-is-like aspect of a certain outcome might be the only
criterion in a transformative decision. In that case, the decision cannot be ra-
tional (assuming the truth of the other premises in Paul’s argument). On the
other hand, the what-it-is-like aspect might be of no concern in transforma-
tive decisions. Accordingly, the rationality of such transformative decisions is
not threatened. Again, the reality of a transformative decision is likely to be
somewhere in between these two extremes, i.e. most people when making a
choice on whether to become a parent will consider various decision criteria
like (a) financial situation, (b) what their partner wants, (c) whether having
a child fits into one’s vision for life, etc., and, perhaps also what it will feel
like to have a child. Thus, the transformative decisions people face, will most
likely be multi-criteria decisions. Paul acknowledges situations in which the
subjective value plays no role at all, e.g., when discussing the king who deci-
des to become a parent because he needs an heir to his throne. However, Paul
fails to provide an answer to the question of how important the subjective
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value must be when multiple criteria need to be evaluated.
An answer to this question can be easily given by making concrete what
we have so far only considered in abstract terms. Thus, take Mary who con-
templates the choice of becoming a parent. At first, Mary realizes that three
criteria of varying importance are relevant to her. Most important to her is
(a) whether her partner would like to have a baby. Less important but still
of considerable weight is the question of (b) whether she and her partner
can financially provide for a child. She also (c) imagines what it will be like
for her to have a baby: while she thinks that the subjective value should be
taken into account when making such a decision, the other two criteria play
a greater role. We can put this in numerical terms by stating that the crite-
ria priorities or weights wi are as follows: wpartner = 0.4 (read this as saying
that the criterion <partner> accounts for 40% of the decision process), wcosts
= 0.35, wwhatitslike = 0.25.11 The values for all criteria priorities should, of
course, add up to 1, which is equivalent to saying that all decision criteria
make up 100% of the decision process. In the second stage of the decision
process, Mary determines the so-called local alternative priorities or values
vi, that is, how much the three criteria favor a certain outcome.12 Let us first
suppose that Mary’s partner very much would like to have a child. Thus,
for criterion <partner>, Mary assigns the value 1 to the outcome ’having a
child’, i.e. vpartner/pro child = 1, and 0 to ’not having a child’ (vpartner/contra child
= 0). Second, the financial situation of Mary and her partner is stable but
not great. Thus, for criterion <costs>, Mary assigns the values vcosts/pro child
= 0.5 and vcosts/contra child = 0.5. The subjective values vwhatitslike/pro child and
11There are at least four common assumptions that most models of such decision processes
make: (1) separability of the decision criteria (in order to avoid double-counting), (2)
numerical ascertainability of the criteria weights, (3) weight and value attributions range
between ’0’ and ’1’, and (4) for each i, voutcome1+voutcome2 = 1. The empirical studies
in the next section will demonstrate, how we arrived at the numerical weights of each
decision-criterion. Furthermore, we will address objections against the separability of the
decision criteria in the General Discussion.
12This is the usual terminology used in Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (see e.g. Ishizaka
& Nemery 2013, p. 16)
9
vwhatitslike/contra child are unknown. By adding up the products of the weights
and values, we can determine the overall utilities Uoutcome =
n∑
i=1
ui =
n∑
i=1
vi ∗wi
for each of the two outcomes given the first two decision criteria:
Upro child = 1 ∗ wpartner + 0.5 ∗ wcosts = 1 ∗ 0.4 + 0.5 ∗ 0.35 = 0.575.
Ucontra child = 0 ∗ wpartner + 0.5 ∗ wcosts = 0 ∗ 0.4 + 0.5 ∗ 0.35 = 0.175.
Now, even if the subjective value were to strongly speak against having
a baby, e.g. vwhatitslike/contra child = 1, because Mary would feel completely
drained by the additional responsibility and the lack of sleep, the overall
utility of not having a child would be at most Ucontra child = 0.425 (0.175 +
0.25) and thus still much lower than Upro child = 0.575. Thus, the what-it-is-
like aspect of having a child has no bearing on the outcome of Mary’s decision
on whether or not to have a child. In other words, the subjective value is not
important enough to influence the decision process: the transformative choice
is rational. In order to guarantee that premise (iii) of Paul’s argument is
true, and, hence, that the transformative decision is not rational, the weight
of the subjective value wwhatitslike needs to be at least 0.5, i.e. it should
at least account for 50% of the decision process. If the weight is equal or
greater than 0.5, then even if all the other criteria speak for one outcome,
the overall utility can flip in favor of the opposite outcome. If the weight is
lower, however, then it is possible that the transformative decision is rational.
We can therefore state more precisely what is meant by central in premise (ii)
of Paul’s argument: The subjective value plays the central role in a decision
process if and only if it is at least as important as all other criteria taken
together.13
How threatening are these considerations for the view that Paul holds?
13We do not claim that the way we have cashed out the notion of centrality matches
Paul’s concept of centrality. As mentioned above, Paul remains more or less silent on
this matter.
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There seem to be two possible ways to respond to the challenge we pose:
First, one might maintain that the weight wwhatitslike is generally greater
than 0.5. The empirical data in Section 3 shows that such a response would
be mistaken. Second, we might highlight that the value of 0.5 is only a cut-
off point above which it is not possible to ordinally rank the outcomes. In
almost all situations, however, a lower weight will still be sufficiently high.
In the example above, wwhatitslike = 0.25 was not sufficiently high, but if the
weight had been just a little higher, then no rational decision could have been
made. In order to assess the strength of the second response, we now need
to determine the dependency of the rationality of a transformative choice on
the weights of the subjective value wwhatitslike.
2.2 When a transformative decision is likely rational
While in the last subsection, we focused on the possibility of making a rational
transformative choice, in this section we will provide an answer to how likely
it is that people make rational transformative choices. In the example above,
we have seen that the criteria <partner> and <costs> were too important
for the subjective value to play any role. Let us start by stating in more
general terms when a transformative decision is rational. Assuming a binary
choice, if one outcome is considered to be so much better than the other
outcome, such that the subjective value will not make any difference, then the
transformative decision is rational. It then simply does not matter whether
the value vwhatitslike can be determined or not. More precisely, we can state
condition (R):
(R) | Uoutcome 1 - Uoutcome 2 | ≥ wwhatitslike,
where Uoutcome =
n∑
i=1
vi∗wi. (R) states that the absolute difference between
the overall utility of one outcome and the overall utility of the other outcome –
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without taking into account the subjective value – is greater than wwhatitslike.
If (R) holds, then the transformative decision is rational.
Thus, the two types of variable that are required to determine whether
or not a transformative decision is rational, are the weights of the criteria wi
as well as the values vi. It seems we can now simply ask people to tell us the
vi and wi of the various decision criteria and plug them into our formula. If
Paul is correct in thinking that transformative decisions are in general not ra-
tional, we should find that most people violate condition (R), i.e. wwhatitslike
is sufficiently big to have a decisive influence on transformative decisions. In
the next section, we present the results of several studies in which we asked
hundreds of participants to report the weights wi when being imaginatively
confronted with various transformative decisions. However, we did not also
determine the values vi of the various decision criteria because this would
have required of us to only consider people who currently face a transforma-
tive decision.14 The online surveys we conducted allowed us to collect the wi
relatively easily from a random sample of people from the Amazon Mechani-
cal Turk pool. While it would have been fascinating to interview people who
are currently confronted with a transformative decision, this was not feasible
for the purposes of this study.15
Are we therefore left without the means to connect the importance of
the subjective value with the rationality of a transformative decision? No,
fortunately, statistical models can be used to predict how likely it will be
that a transformative decision is rational given the weight wwhatitslike. In
our first statistical model, we simplified the complexity of the situation by
assigning values vi to each criterion by assuming that the values vi can only
take on values ‘1‘ and ‘0‘. Thus, we assume that a decision criterion either
14To see why, consider again the choice of whether or not to have a child. Some decisi-
on criteria like <partner> are indeterminate for most participants unless they have a
partner and are currently in the process of making such a decision.
15This restriction on our studies might fuel the worry that the participants’ ratings are
not representative of decisions that are made in actual decision-making contexts. We
will respond to this worry in section 3 and section 4.
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fully speaks in favor (1) of an option, e.g. having a child, or speaks against (0)
the option, e.g. against having a child. Using the example from above, besides
what it is like to feel being a parent, Mary considers two decision criteria to
be relevant, <partner> and <costs>. Thus, there are 22 = 4 possibilities in
which the values can be combined: (1,1), (1,0), (0,1), (0,0). Using (R) above,
we can therefore calculate how likely it is that John will make a rational
decision.
1. |1 ∗ 0.4 + 1 ∗ 0.35− (0 ∗ 0.4 + 0 ∗ 0.35)| = 0.75 > 0.25 (rational)
2. |1 ∗ 0.4 + 0 ∗ 0.35− (0 ∗ 0.4 + 1 ∗ 0.35)| = 0.05 < 0.25 (not rational)
3. |0 ∗ 0.4 + 1 ∗ 0.35− (1 ∗ 0.4 + 0 ∗ 0.35)| = 0.05 < 0.25 (not rational)
4. |0 ∗ 0.4 + 0 ∗ 0.35− (1 ∗ 0.4 + 1 ∗ 0.35)| = 0.75 > 0.25 (rational)
Thus, in two out of four, i.e. 50% of the combinations, John will make
a rational decision. In many transformative choices, there will be, of course,
many more decision criteria that might be relevant to people’s choices. In all
the empirical studies we conducted (next section), we presented people with
a total of six criteria including the subjective value. Thus, for the other five
criteria, there are 25 = 32 different possibilities that need to be calculated to
determine the overall number of rational decisions giving the weights of all
decision criteria, e.g. (1,1,1,1,1), (1,0,1,0,1).
We are now in a position to outline for some specific cases, the depen-
dency of the rationality of a transformative decision on the subjective value
wwhatitslike. Aside from using five decision criteria (excluding <what it is li-
ke>) and normalizing the values to 1, we first consider the case in which
all weights (excluding the weight of the subjective value) are equal, i.e. w1
= w2= w3 = w4 = w5 = (1 − wwhatitslike)/5. Starting with these assumpti-
ons, the number of rational transformative choices can be determined by the
following formula:
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Number of Rational Decisions = 2 ∗ 	(1 − 2 ∗ wwhatitslike) +
10 ∗ 	(3− 8 ∗ wwhatitslike) + 20 ∗ 	(1− 6 ∗ wwhatitslike)
The plot of this function16 for this very general case is also depicted in
Figure 1 (upper-left hand side). Importantly, the graph shows that the less
important the subjective value is (the smaller wwhatitslike), the greater the
number of rational decisions, and hence the more likely that the person will
indeed make a rational transformative decision. Given the assumptions we
used, which simplified both weights wi as well as values vi, merely four diffe-
rent steps need to be distinguished. If wwhatitslike falls below 0.5, there are two
combinations for which the transformative decision is rational, namely the
ones in which all other criteria speak in favor of the same outcome. However,
if wwhatitslike is lower than 0.375, then there are already 12 combinations for
which the decision turns out to be rational. An even lower value of 0.16 or
smaller ensures that the transformative decision is necessarily rational (all
32 possible combinations are rational decisions). These results might be in-
terpreted to support Paul’s view at least to some extent. After all, even if the
subjective value does not play the central role, it might be important enough
such that only very few combinations turn out to be rational. We will see
that this optimism is premature.
For this admittedly simple model sketched above, we find that the lower
wwhatitslike, the greater the number of rational decisions. But does this rela-
tion also hold, once we adopt a more realistic model? It does. To simulate
a more complex situation, we dropped the assumption that all weights of
16	(x) is the Heaviside step function taking the value 0 if x < 0, and 1 otherwise. We give a
brief explanation of how the first term of the formula can be derived. The other terms can
be calculated in a similar fashion. In the case in which all non-experiential criteria speak
in favor of one outcome, then the decision will be rational if |w1+w2+w3+w4+w5| ≥
wwhatitslike. We can now substitute wi = (1−wwhatitslike)/5 and simplify the equation,
which yields 1−2∗wwhatitslike > 0. Thus, the condition is satisfied only if wwhatitslike is
smaller than 0.5. There are two possibilities that need to be considered: the case in which
all non-experiential criteria speak in favor of one outcome, and the case in which they
all speak against a certain outcome. Hence, the first term is 2 ∗ 	(1− 2 ∗ wwhatitslike).
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the non-experiential decision criteria are assigned the same value. Rather,
we stipulated weights of increasing value: w1 < w2 < w3 < w4 < w517. The
upper-right hand side of Figure 1 shows how the number of rational decisions
depends on the importance of wwhatitslike. Again, a decrease in the importan-
ce of the subjective value leads to an increase in the likelihood of making a
rational transformative choice. As the lower part of Figure 1 shows, the gene-
ral increase in rational decisions with decreasing wwhatitslike neither depends
on the normalization of the values (lower-left hand side; v1 = 0.3, v2 = 0.7,
v3 = 0.3, v4 = 0.7, v5 = 0.3), nor on having used five additional criteria
(lower-right hand side, four criteria).
Figure 1: Plots of functions depicting the relation between the weight wwhatitslike (X-Axis) and the
number of rational decisions (Y-Axis). Upper left, weights wi for all criteria except wwhatitslike are
equal. Values vi are normalized; Upper rights, weights wi for all criteria are different. Values vi are
normalized; Bottom left, weights wi for all criteria are different. Values vi are not normalized; Bottom
right, weights wi for all criteria are different. Only four additional criteria were used.
We have varied several parameters that play a role in determining the
17More precisely, we assigned the following priorities to each criteria v1 = 1 * (1-
wwhatitslike) / 15 < v2 = 2 * (1-wwhatitslike) / 15 < v3 = 3 * (1-wwhatitslike) / 15
< v4 = 4 * (1-wwhatitslike) / 15 < v5 = 5 * (1-wwhatitslike) / 15.
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dependency of the number of rational transformative decisions on the sub-
jective value. The results paint a clear picture: The likelihood that a person
makes a rational transformative decision is greater, the smaller the weight of
the subjective value is. Thus, those people who do not consider the subjective
value to be very important in their decision process, will have a great chance
of making rational transformative decisions. However, perhaps Paul is right,
that a central tenet or our culture’s ordinary way of thinking about trans-
formative decisions is to place sufficiently high emphasis on the subjective
value. We will now see that this view is mistaken.
3 Empirical Studies
Paul claims that transformative decisions dt are not rational. In order for
Paul’s argument to go through, the subjective value of a transformative expe-
rience needs to be the central decision criterion. Furthermore, in the previous
section, we developed a model that allows us to calculate the likelihood of an
individual making a rational transformative choice, provided we do have the
weights of all the decision criteria of that individual. In this part of the paper,
we present the results of an empirical investigation on transformative decisi-
ons to examine (i) whether the subjective value of a transformative decision
is central, and (ii) how likely it is that subjects make rational transformative
choices.
3.1 Methods
Paul and most commentators of her work mostly focus on those transfor-
mative decisions that are not only epistemically (e.g., spices case) but also
personally transformative, i.e. decisions that will change the core preferences
of the person making the decision. The two examples that have arguably
received the greatest attention in Paul’s work are the decisions on whether
or not to become a parent and whether or not to become a vampire. We also
16
added our own case in which a subject has to decide to either leave earth or
continue to live on earth but under alien rule. In what follows we present the
results of three empirical studies involving those personally transformative
choices.
In order to determine the most plausible criteria for all three cases, we
ran a pretest in which we randomly assigned 81 participants to either the
parent case, the vampire case, or the alien rule case. Subjects were asked to
tell us three criteria they would consider most important when making such a
decision. The most common answers were then collected and categorized. In
the parent case, the following five criteria were most frequently mentioned:
(a) discussions with partner, (b) financial costs, (c) collecting information
from books and various other sources, (d) subjective value, (e) consistency
with other goals in life. Some participants also mentioned that they would
contemplate how the decision would change their life. Interestingly, Paul’s
positive account relates closely to these responses. According to her positi-
ve view, we should base our choices in transformative decisions on whether
we will be happy to possibly become a person with fundamentally different
preferences and undergo changes to our personality. Given the responses and
our interest in empirically investigating Paul’s suggestion, we also included
openness to change as a sixth decision criteria. We would also like to menti-
on that Antti Kauppinen (2015) has suggested that people should base their
transformative choices on how much they are consistent with their previous
goals. While Kauppinen makes a normative claim on how people should ma-
ke a decision, the descriptive version of his claim closely matches criteria (e).
Paul has repeatedly argued that the subjective value of an outcome of a de-
cision needs to be understood widely as the "value of lived experience"(Paul,
2015b, p. 513). In the General Discussion we will discuss the objection that
some of the criteria that we listed as independent from the subjective value
actually fall under Paul’s conception of the value of lived experience.
For the main study, a total of 181 participants were recruited on Amazon’s
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Mechanical Turk. 81 participants were assigned to the parent case, 39 (14
female, Mage = 36.87, STD = 11.43) participants to the vampire case, and
41 (16 female, (16 female, Mage = 36.61, STD = 12.20)) participants to
the alien rule case. In the parent case, 28 participants had to be excluded
because they were already parents. However, we did analyze their ratings to
investigate the robustness of the importance of the decision criteria. Of the
remaining 53 participants, 23 were female, and the mean age was Mage =
31.87 (STD = 9.75). The vignette in the parent case read as follows:18
Parent Case Imagine considering becoming a parent and having to decide whether
or not to have a child. How would you arrive at a decision?
The participants were then asked to rate the importance of six decision
criteria (random order) on a scale from ’0’ meaning ’not at all important’ to
’10’ meaning ’extremely important’. The decision criteria were as follows:
• I discuss it with my partner.
• I imagine what it will feel like to have the experiences and emotions when being a
parent.
• I consider external factors like financial costs.
• I consider whether becoming a parent is most consistent with the goals I have for
my life, like career plans and my vision of family life.
• I consider whether I will be happy to possibly become a person with fundamentally
different preferences and undergo changes to my personality.
• I read about the pros and cons of having a baby.
18The vignette in the vampire case, for instance, was formulated following Paul’s capti-
vating introduction on p. 1 in Paul (2014). The vignette in the alien rule scenario was:
Imagine that aliens have taken over the world, and you have to make the choice between
either being transported to an unknown planet where you can start a new life, or stay-
ing on earth but living under unknown alien rule. Now suppose you have to make the
decision immediately. How would you arrive at a decision?
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The subjective value was operationalized by using the criterion “I imagine
what it will feel like to have the experiences and emotions when being a
parent“.
3.2 Results
In order to evaluate the differences between the various decision criteria in
relation to the rating for the subjective value, we applied a repeated measures
ANOVA with Rating as the dependent variable and Criteria as independent
factor with six levels (ask partner, subjective value, costs, consistency, open-
ness, reading). The means and p-values for the criteria in the parent case are
listed in Table 1.
Table 1: The importance of all six decision criteria in the parent-case averaged over all participants.
For the parent case, the pairwise comparisons show that the ratings for
the subjective value (7.68) is only fourth after ask partner (8.66), costs (8.26),
and consistency (7.85). Differences between these four criteria were not si-
gnificant. A slightly different picture was obtained in the vampire scenario.
Here, the subjective value was rated second highest (6.79) after openness to
change (7.18). In the alien rule case, the subjective value (7.15) was the most
important decision criterion but not significantly different compared to all
other decision criteria. Thus, in all three studies we conducted, the subjec-
tive value, was only one of many decision criteria that was considered to be
important.
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Given the absolute ratings of each participant, we calculated the relative
weights of all six criteria for each individual.19 We then determined the ave-
rage weights of all the criteria across all participants. When comparing the
importance of these criteria, we found that the subjective value determines
the outcome of the decision process only by 17%. Other criteria like financial
costs (19%) and what one’s partner wants (20%) seem to be on average more
important to people. The results are shown in Figure 2 and demonstrate that
the relative weight of the subjective value is much smaller than the cut-off
value of 0.5 that we determined to be the crucial value for Paul’s argument
to be sound.
Figure 2: Relative weights of all decision criteria averaged over all 52 participants in the parent-case.
The subjective value only takes 17% of the overall weight in the decision on whether or not to become a
parent and is not more central than other criteria.
19The relative weights of the decision criteria were calculated as follows: We divided each
individual rating by the sum of the ratings of all six decision criteria. Thus, imagine
that a person gave the following ratings: Ask partner (7), Subjective Value (6), Costs
(8), Consistency (5), Openness (3); Reading (1). The sum of all ratings is hence 30. The
relative weights of the decision criteria are consequently: Ask partner (7/30 = 0.23),
Subjective value (0.2), Costs (0.27), Consistency (0.17), Openness (0.1); Reading (0.03).
Note also, that the results do not change when irrelevant criteria are added because the
overall sum of the ratings is independent of the number of criteria.
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3.3 Likelihood of Rational Decision
Although we have established that the subjective value is not central and
hence the decision process possibly rational, we have argued in Section 2,
that the weights themselves do not give us a final verdict of whether a subject
will make a rational decision or not. To make that determination, we need
the respective values of the decision criteria, i.e. we need to know whether
a certain criterion speaks in favor or against a certain outcome. As we do
not know these values, primarily because they are very difficult to come by,
we developed a statistical model in Section 2 that enables us to calculate
the likelihood that a subject will make a rational choice. By using a binary
system, assigning either the values ’1’ or ’0’ to the two possible outcomes,
we can specify how likely it is that the person will make a rational choice.
In order to do so, we took the connection weights of each participant in our
study, and calculated (using a computer script) the ratio of rational and not-
rational choices (for details see Section 2). As there are five decision criteria
aside from the subjective value, the total possible combinations were 32 for
each participant.
Applying the statistical model revealed that only 6 out of 53 participants
who completed the survey had a chance of less than 50% to make a rational
choice. The distribution of the number of rational decisions for each partici-
pant in the study is depicted in Figure 3. On average, the subjective value
influences people’s decisions in only 35% of cases. Thus, people have a chance
of around 65% to make a rational choice. (For comparison: discussions with
partner determine almost 50% of all decisions, reading literature in only 24%
of the possible combinations). In the alien rule case, in which the subjective
received the highest rating, the results do not support Paul’s thesis much
more strongly: 59% of the possible decisions turned out to be rational deci-
sions. It is therefore safe to say that given the empirical results we obtained
and the statistical model we applied, it is likely that people make rational
transformative decisions. This is not because we exclude the subjective value
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from the decision-making process like the king who needs an heir. Instead,
the subjective value is contemplated about but its role can often be neglected
due its relatively low significance.
Figure 3: Histogram showing how many of a total of 32 decisions turn out to be rational for each
participant using the statistical model described in the main text, e.g. one participant rated the
importance of the criteria such that only 7 out of 32 decisions would be rational, for four participants, all
combination yielded rational decisions.
3.4 Discussion
The decision to become a parent is one of the most wide-ranging decisions a
person can make in his or her life. When we make this decision, we take va-
rious decision criteria under consideration, among them the subjective value
of what it is like to be a parent. Other transformative decisions like whether
or not to become a vampire also feature largely in discussions surrounding
Paul’s claim on the rationality of transformative decisions. The results of the
empirical studies demonstrate that the subjective value fails to play the cen-
tral role in these decision processes for most people. Instead, as the average
values suggest, the subjective value is only one among many decision criteria
that plays a certain role when making such a decision. Thus, it seems that
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the claim that transformative decisions are not rational needs to be substan-
tially revised. In fact, most people when facing transformative decisions –
assuming our studies to be representative – have a very good chance that
their decision will be rational.
4 General Discussion
Some of the most fundamental decisions we make in our lives are transforma-
tive and – if Paul’s argument is sound – fall outside the realm of rationality.
Thus, the importance of a project investigating transformative decisions both
empirically as well as analytically can hardly be underestimated. In this pa-
per, we have done three things: First, we have highlighted a crucial premise
in Paul’s argument, the investigation of which has so far been neglected.
In order to be able to conclude that transformative decisions are not ratio-
nal, the subjective value of a transformative decision needs to be central for
the decision process. Second, we have specified the conditions under which
transformative decisions are possibly rational and likely to be rational. Our
analysis showed that if the weight of the subjective value is lower than the
weights of all other criteria taken together, the transformative decision is
possibly rational. We then developed four statistical models which suggest
that the lower the importance of the subjective value, the more likely it is
that a transformative decision is rational. Third, the empirical investigation
on transformative decisions revealed that the importance of the subjective
value is often much lower than has so far been assumed both by Laurie Paul
herself as well as other scholars working on this topic. For most people, it is
not only the case that it is possible that they make a rational transformative
choice but it is also quite likely that they do so.
It is important to note that we have not determined how many people
actually decide rationally when facing transformative choices. The experi-
ments were not designed to deliver such an answer. In order to make that
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determination, we have argued in Section 2 that not only does one need to
collect the weights wi of the various decision criteria (which we have done),
but also the values vi that indicate whether the respective criteria speak in
favor or against a certain outcome (which we have not done). Experiments
that collect these values vi are highly desirable but are also much more costly
and time-consuming to come by.20 However, given the statistical models we
developed, it is still possible to move beyond what is actually given in the
empirical data. For each and every participant in our study, the application of
such models allowed us to calculate the likelihood with which they will make
a rational choice. The results pose a serious challenge to Paul’s depiction of
transformative choices. While she would be right to claim that transformati-
ve decisions are possibly not rational, the empirical reality reveals a picture
according to which transformative decisions are likely to be rational for the
majority of people. In the remainder of this paper, we tackle four objections
against both our approach as well as the results we presented.
First, one might argue that whereas we have tackled the question of the
centrality of the subjective value, we have neglected the role of possible chan-
ges in a person’s core preferences, that are a center piece in Paul’s discussion.
However, note, that the issue of possible changes in a person’s core prefe-
rences only becomes a problem, if the decision is at least partially based on
the subjective value itself. Thus, a person who makes a decision in favor of
becoming a mother and brackets the transformative experience from her con-
siderations, does not make a non-rational choice even if she later regrets her
decision based on the experiences she makes.21 Paul herself has stated that
people who decide to become a parent because, e.g., they want more hands
20One possible exception to the claim that we do not know the direction of the criteria
are the financial costs of having a child, which in our culture will mostly speak against
having a child. The decision-making problem could therefore perhaps be simplified.
21See Pettigrew (2015) for an interesting discussion of the problem of how to weigh prefe-
rences, which might change as a result of making a choice. In this regard there might also
exist an interesting question for personal identity (Parfit 1984), i.e., do transformative
experiences undermine psychological continuity?
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to work the farm, do not fail to make rational decisions. Nonetheless, one
might push this objection a little further by arguing that changes to one’s
preferences not only affect the values vi which we assign for each criterion
to different outcomes, but also the weights wi of the various criteria them-
selves. Furthermore, although many people in our studies did not rate the
subjective value to be sufficiently high to have an impact on their decision,
the subjective value was not completely disregarded. Thus, if a person’s pre-
ferences change such that the weight of the what-it-is-like criterion becomes
so important that she would have decided differently, then arguably the de-
cision would have failed to be rational. In the end, we believe, this objection
is also open to empirical verification. While we do not have hard evidence
for how the relative importance of decision criteria in transformative choices
might change, the data we collected from people who already have children
indicate that the weights of the decision criteria (at least for the parent case)
are fairly robust (see also next objection).
A second objection can be mounted against the general approach that we
pursue in this paper. How can we be certain that the participants’ responses
reflect their real preferences or their real behavior? It is known from psycho-
logical studies, for instance, that moral responses in controlled settings do
not always correlate with real moral behavior (Epley et al. 2000). However,
a variety of empirical studies have also shown high consistency between peo-
ple’s stated preferences and their revealed preferences, e.g., when it comes to
consumer choices (Loureiro et al. 2003) or family planning (De Silva 1991).
Thus, the strength of the objection is likely to strongly depend on the re-
spective context. Unfortunately, there is no empirical evidence we are aware
of that points in favor of or against using our methodology for the investi-
gation of transformative choices. We are also not aware of any theoretical
arguments from the literature for why people’s responses might not reflect
their real preferences in our experimental settings. It might, of course, be
argued that there is a large time gap between people’s revealed preferences
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and when they finally make such decisions. A shorter time gap could disclose
a greater importance of the subjective value. Let us give a two-pronged re-
sponse. First, we can safely assume that all the people we asked have already
made many transformative decisions – some more important, some less. It is
therefore quite plausible to expect that those people can draw upon a wealth
of past experiences when judging how important the subjective value is for
upcoming decisions. Second, for the parent case, we not only asked partici-
pants who are not yet parents, but also those who are already parents. We
asked the latter group to tell us how important the various criteria were,
when they made their decision. The results reveal a remarkable consistency
between non-parents and parents. The only criterion for which a significant
difference was recorded was <costs>. Whereas singles rate the importance
of financial costs highly, parents do not believe that those costs were crucial
in their decision to become parents.
The third objection tackles a crucial underlying presupposition in our
approach. A strong assumption of multi-criteria decision processes is that a
proper evaluation of the various criteria, requires that they are independent of
each other. This independence is important because a criterion should not be
double-counted. The experiments that we conducted do not discuss whether
people actually make trade-offs between different criteria. To illustrate the
problem, imagine that two criteria (e.g. costs and consistency with previous
goals) speak against having a child. If people interpret consistency with goals
as having a specific amount of money, then costs are at least partially double-
counted. In other words, the criteria which speak against an outcome would
then be overstated. While we have taken care to minimize such distortions
by conducting pretests to select the respective criteria, it is hardly possible
to fully avoid small dependencies in individual responses.
Fourth, and relatedly, one might challenge the idea that the importance
of the what-it-is-like criteria can be determined independently from the other
criteria. One might even go so far in arguing that the what-it-is-like criterion
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functions as a placeholder for every other criteria, e.g. when you imagine what
it will feel like to have a child, you imagine what it will feel like to spend less
money for holidays, etc. Paul has explicitly stated that the subjective value
includes "ways we’d experience ourselves in such outcomes"(2015b, p. 514).
Kauppinen (2015) and Paul (2015b) have, for instance, debated in how far the
criterion <consistency with goals> is an integral part of the subjective value
in a transformative decision. However, it seems that at least in the parent
case the majority of the criteria like <ask partner>, <costs>, and <reading>
have little to no bearing on the subjective value of the outcomes. Thus,
independently of how you imagine it will feel like, you either consider your
partner’s opinion and the ensuing costs of the decision to be important or
not. We can also assume that the criterion <openness to change> is distinct
from the subjective value, given that Paul suggests we should rather make
transformative decisions by relying on how much we value new experiences
or new selves instead of relying on the subjective value of the outcomes.
Investigating transformative decisions empirically comes with several me-
thodological difficulties. We hope that further experimental studies will fol-
low, which refine the methods and hence deliver more precise results in re-
gards to when and under which conditions people make or are likely to make
a rational transformative decision. Given the results we presented in this pa-
per, it seems highly likely that many transformative decisions fall inside the
realm of rationality. We believe the least we have done is to shift the burden
of proof to those who continue to argue for the opposite claim.
5 Conclusion
The status of transformative experiences plays a crucial role in the argument
against the rationality of transformative decisions. Not only are those experi-
ences supposed to be impenetrable, the subjective value needs to be central in
transformative decision processes. In this paper, we have analyzed the notion
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of centrality and have shown what it takes for transformative decisions to be
possibly as well as likely rational. We then provided an empirical investigati-
on of transformative decisions. Perhaps surprisingly, the subjective value not
only turned out to be not central in transformative decision processes, the
results revealed that most people are more likely than not to make rational
transformative decisions even if they take into account the subjective value
of the transformative choice.
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